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I. INTRODUCTION
On July 26, 2000, final approval was granted to a landmark
$1.25 billion settlement of the claims of an international class of
Holocaust victims against Swiss Banks that engaged in massive
looting and misappropriation of assets entrusted to them by hundreds
of thousands of Jews and other groups1 imprisoned, murdered, and
. Partner, Lieff, Cabraser, Heimann & Bernstein, LLP (New York/San Francisco), Visiting
Professor, Columbia University School of Law (Spring 2003/Spring 2004). Lieff Cabraser served
on the court-appointed plaintiffs' Executive Committee in the Swiss Banks and Nazi-Era
litigations. Contact: ecabraser@lchb.com.
1. This settlement was designed to benefit persons recognized as targets of systematic
Nazi oppression on the basis of race, religion, or personal status. "Accordingly, at the initiative
of plaintiffs' Executive Committee, the settlement was explicitly designed to benefit Jews,
homosexuals, Jehovah's Witnesses, the disabled, and Romani [Gypsies]-groups recognized by
the United Nations as having been the targets of systematic Nazi persecution .... " In re
Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 105 F. Supp. 2d 139, 143 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) [hereinafter Swiss
Banks].
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dislocated by the Nazi regime. 2 The Swiss Banks complaints linked
the actions of Swiss financial institutions to the Nazi regime and its
program of genocide. 3
The Swiss Banks litigation was brought and settled under
federal class action rules 4 in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of New York. The class action was brought on behalf
of five plaintiff classes, 5 whose members resided in over fifty countries
2. Id. at 141, 167. Other decisions authored by Judge Korman, who granted preliminary
and final settlement approval to the Swiss Banks settlement that address various aspects of the
amendment, allocation, and implementation of the Swiss Banks settlement, are reported at: No.
CV-96-4849, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10011 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 2004); 302 F. Supp. 2d 59 (E.D.N.Y.
2004); 302 F. Supp. 2d 89 (E.D.N.Y. 2004); 256 F. Supp. 2d 150 (E.D.N.Y. 2003); 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 20686 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 2003); 270 F. Supp. 2d 313 (E.D.N.Y. 2002); 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 15644 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2000); 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20817 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 2000).
3. The court summarized the allegations and legal theories of the Swiss Banks litigation
as follows:
Plaintiffs alleged that, before and during World War II, they were subjected to
persecution by the Nazi regime, including genocide, wholesale and systematic looting
of personal and business property and slave labor. Plaintiffs alleged that, in
knowingly retaining and concealing the assets of Holocaust victims, accepting and
laundering illegally obtained Nazi loot and transacting in the profits of slave labor,
Swiss institutions and entities, including the named defendants, collaborated with
and aided the Nazi regime in furtherance of war crimes, crimes against humanity,
crimes against peace, slave labor and genocide. Plaintiffs also alleged that defendants
breached fiduciary and other duties; breached contracts; converted plaintiffs' property;
enriched themselves unjustly; were negligent; violated customary international law,
Swiss banking law and the Swiss commercial code of obligations; engaged in fraud
and conspiracy; and concealed relevant facts from the named plaintiffs and the
plaintiff class members in an effort to frustrate plaintiffs' ability to pursue their
claims. Plaintiffs sought an accounting, disgorgement, compensatory and punitive
damages, and declaratory and other appropriate relief.
Swiss Banks, 105 F. Supp. 2d. at 141-42.
4. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a), (b)(3), (e).
5. While the $1.25 billion settlement was, as described above, designed to benefit specific
populations targeted by the Nazis for oppression or annihilation, the plaintiff settlement classes
themselves were defined objectively and functionally, as class action practice prescribes. See
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 21.222 (2004) ("The definition must be precise,
objective, and presently ascertainable. ... The order defining the class should avoid subjective
standards (e.g., plaintiffs state of mind) or terms that depend upon resolution of the merits (e.g.,
persons who were discriminated against).") Accordingly, the five plaintiffs' settlement classes
were officially defined as follows:
1. Deposited Assets Class: The Deposited Assets Class consists of victims or targets
of Nazi persecution and their heirs, successors, administrators, executors, affiliates
and assigns who have or at any time have asserted, assert or may in the future seek
to assert claims against any releasee for relief of any kind whatsoever relating to or
arising in any way from deposited assets or any effort to recover deposited assets.
2. Looted Assets Class: The Looted Assets Class consists of victims or targets Of Nazi
persecution and their heirs, successors, administrators, executors, affiliates and
assigns who have or at any time have asserted, assert or may in the future seek to
assert claims against any releasee for relief of any kind whatsoever relating to or
arising in any way from looted assets or cloaked assets or any effort to recover looted
assets or cloaked assets.
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and spoke over thirty languages. 6 Most of the court-appointed class
counsel either served without fee in the five-year prosecution and
settlement of the litigation or donated their court-awarded fees to
international human rights endeavors.
7
On December 5, 2000, a second court, the United States
District Court for the District of New Jersey, approved an
international diplomatic/legal agreement creating a foundation titled
"Remembrance, Responsibility and the Future," (the "Foundation"),
funded with DM $10 Billion (approximately $5 billion U.S.D.). The
3. Slave Labor Class I: Slave Labor Class I consists of victims or targets of Nazi
persecution and their heirs, executors, administrators and assigns who actually or
allegedly performed slave labor for companies or entities that actually or allegedly
deposited the revenues or proceeds of that labor with, or transacted such revenues or
proceeds through, releasees, and who have or at any time have asserted, assert or
may in the future seek to assert claims against any releasee for relief of any kind
whatsoever relating to or arising in any way from the deposit of such revenues or
proceeds or cloaked assets or any effort to obtain redress in connection with the
revenues or proceeds from slave labor or cloaked assets.
4. Slave Labor Class II: Slave Labor Class II consists of individuals and their heirs,
executors, administrators and assigns who actually or allegedly performed slave labor
at any facility or work site, wherever located, actually or allegedly owned, controlled
or operated by any corporation or other business concern headquartered, organized or
based in Switzerland or any affiliate thereof, and who have or at any time have
asserted, assert or may in the future seek to assert claims against any releasee other
than settling defendants, the Swiss National Bank, and other Swiss banks for relief of
any kind whatsoever relating to or arising in any way from such slave labor or cloaked
assets or any effort to obtain redress in connection with slave labor or cloaked assets.
5. Refugee Class: The Refugee Class consists of victims or targets of Nazi persecution
and their heirs, executors, administrators and assigns who sought entry into
Switzerland in whole or in part to avoid Nazi persecution and who actually or
allegedly either were denied entry into Switzerland or, after gaining entry, were
deported, detained, abused or otherwise mistreated, and who have or at any time have
asserted, assert or may in the future seek to assert claims against any releasee for
relief of any kind whatsoever relating to or arising in any way from such actual or
alleged denial of entry, deportation, detention, abuse or other mistreatment.
Swiss Banks, 105 F. Supp. 2d. at 143-44.
6. The prosecution and settlement of the Swiss Banks litigation is described in detail by
Morris A. Ratner, The Settlement of Nazi-Era Litigation Through the Executive and Judicial
Branches, 20 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 212 (2002) (analyzing the procedures utilized to effectuate the
worldwide settlement of class claims in Swiss Banks and comparing this formal Rule 23, court-
approved settlement procedure with the alternate approach utilized shortly thereafter to resolve
related claims in the Nazi-Era litigation). Morris A. Ratner was a member of the Swiss Banks
court-appointed plaintiffs' Executive Committee. See id. at 212 n.al.
7. "Numerous lawyers, including plaintiffs' lead settlement counsel, have waived all
attorneys' fees. Those relatively few members of the Plaintiffs' Executive Committee who are
seeking fees personally have agreed to limit their fee applications to the traditional 'civil rights'
standard of lodestar for time actually expended that materially advances the litigation, and all
fees are capped at no more than 1.8% of the settlement fund, with discretion to award a lower
sum." Swiss Banks, 105 F. Supp. 2d. at 146. The Court's consideration and rulings on attorneys'
fees are chronicled in the Swiss Banks decisions published at 311 F. Supp. 2d 363 (E.D.N.Y.
2004); 302 F. Supp. 2d 89, 117-20 (E.D.N.Y. 2004); 314 F. Supp. 2d. 155 (E.D.N.Y. 2004); and 270
F. Supp. 2d 313, 319-26 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
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funding for the Foundation was contributed in equal shares by the
German government and German industry, to compensate those who
worked as slave or forced laborers for the Nazi regime in German
factories, were subjected to medical experimentation, were held in
Kinderheims (children's homes)8 or whose property or assets were
misappropriated. 9 Again, this litigation was brought, and its claims
were settled, on behalf of an international class of Holocaust victims,
survivors, and their families. A small set-aside fund paid notices,
administrative costs, and all attorneys' fees. 10
The Nazi-Era cases were a series of actions brought before the
Judicial Panel on Multi-District Litigation ("MDL Panel") and
transferred by the MDL Panel for coordinated proceedings before
Judge Bassler of the District of New Jersey, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
Section 1407.11 The plaintiffs were former "slave laborers" and "forced
laborers" who suffered at the hands of the Nazi regime and the
German companies who assisted it during the Nazi era. 12 The fifty-
8. Some of the German manufacturers who assisted the Axis war effort maintained
"Kinderheims" (literally, "children's homes") where infants born to the company's forced laborers,
and often to forced laborers working on surrounding farms, were taken. These children received
minimal care, at best, and usually died. For example, approximately 350 to 400 Polish and
Russian children were, between 1943 and 1945, placed in VW's Kinderheim. Michael J. Bazyler,
Nuremberg in America: Litigating the Holocaust in the United States Courts, 34 U. RICH. L. REV.
1, 257 (2000). Both Nazi and Allied reports reveal that the babies were kept in deplorable
conditions; towards the end of the war, their mortality rate reached 100%. Id. The Kinderheim
scandal led to an early Holocaust-related lawsuit. In May 1999, Anna Snopczyk, an elderly
Polish national, sued VW in Wisconsin federal court for infanticide. Id. It appears that over 300
Kinderheims were operated in Germany under the Third Reich, including those run by Ford and
Krupp. Id. at 258.
9. In re Nazi-Era Cases Against German Defendants Litig., 198 F.R.D. 429, 430 (D.N.J.
2000) [hereinafter Nazi-Era].
10. See Ratner, supra note 6, at 229.
11. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2005).
12. Victims of the Nazi regime suffered two major forms of enslavement. Some were forced
to work under conditions that were unimaginably harsh but still allowed them to survive the
war. The second category were prisoners who were taken from the concentration and death
camps, who were worked to death, and who were then replaced. Benjamin Ferencz, an American
prosecutor at Nuremberg, describes these two categories as follows:
The Jewish concentration camp workers were less than slaves. Slave masters care for
their human property and try to preserve it; it was the Nazi plan and intention that
the Jews would be used up and then burned. The term "slave" is used in this [book]
only because our vocabulary has no precise word to describe the lowly status of unpaid
workers who are earmarked for destruction.
MICHAEL J. BAZYLER, HOLOCAUST JUSTICE: THE BATTLE FOR RESTITUTION IN AMERICA'S COURTS
60 (2003) (quoting BENJAMIN B. FERENCZ, LESS THAN SLAVES: JEWISH FORCED LABOR AND THE
QUEST FOR COMPENSATION xvii (1979)) [hereinafter HOLOCAUST JUSTICE]. The Holocaust
litigation court documents typically distinguish between "slave laborers" and "forced laborers,"
defining slave laborers as concentration camp inmates earmarked for extermination, and forced
laborers as conquered civilian population and prisoners of war. Michael J. Bazyler, The
Holocaust Restitution Movement in Comparative Perspective, 20 Berkeley J. Int'l L. 11, 27 n.71
2214
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
three actions coordinated by the MDL Panel asserted claims against
German companies, including banks, insurance companies, and
manufacturers (collectively referred to in the litigation as the
"German Industry"), arising from the conduct of the defendants
occurring during the Nazi era. 13 The cases were transferred by the
MDL Panel to facilitate the international settlement agreement,
described by Judge Bassler as "the result of a collaboration among
American plaintiffs' attorneys, representatives of German Industry,
numerous foreign governments including the United States, Germany,
and Israel, and other non-governmental organizations."14  The
Foundation established to embody and distribute the $5 billion
settlement was, in the words of the court, "designed to provide some
compensation to the many surviving victims of the Nazi era whose
claims rest on the conduct of German Industry during that period. In
exchange for receiving this compensation, victims agree to provide
German Industry with legal peace."'
15
The Swiss Banks and Nazi-Era litigations were anything but
"litigation as usual." Both cases were extraordinary, in great part due
to the force and commitment of the personalities who played
irreplaceable roles in both. These include Professor Burt Neuborne, of
New York University Law School, who served as lead class counsel in
the Swiss Banks litigation, as well as in a special master role vis-ii-vis
Judge Korman, and who played a similarly central role in the Nazi-
Era litigation, and Stuart Eizenstat, initially in his role as United
States Undersecretary of State, and later as Deputy Secretary of
Treasury. Other key negotiators and organizations-of which there
(2002). According to Bazyler, the Nazis themselves did not make such a distinction, instead
using the term "Zwangsarbeiter" (forced laborers) to describe all their involuntary workers.
BAZYLER, HOLOCAUST JUSTICE, supra, at 61. Others point to a distinction in Nazi attitude, with
a different rationale and treatment of Jewish slave laborers and Eastern European forced
laborers, with the former expressly targeted for extermination as members of a hated "racial"
group, and the latter, spoils of war. Stephen Whinston, Can Lawyers and Judges Be Good
Historians? A Critical Examination of the Siemens Slave-Labor Cases, 20 Berkeley J. Int'l L.
160, 165 (2002). It is estimated that almost 1.25 million of these former slave or forced laborers
are alive today.
13. These entities included Volkswagen AG, Bayer AG, Siemens AG, Bayerische Motoren
Werke (BMW) AG, Fried Krupp AG, Daimler/Chrysler AG, Ford Motor Co., Commerzbank AG,
Nordstern Art Insurance Corp., and the Republic of Austria. A complete list of appearances for
defendants in the fifty-three actions that were coordinated as In re Nazi Era Cases Against
German Defendants Litigation is set forth at 198 F.R.D. 429, 448-451 (D.N.J. 2000).
14. Nazi Era, 198 F.R.D. at 430.
15. Id.
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were many-are named and described in the judicial decisions
approving the settlements.
16 -
These Holocaust cases exemplified the most idealistic use of
class action procedure, the recognition of the federal common law
incorporation of international human rights principles, and the
accessibility of United States federal courts as a forum for
international claims against governmental entities and private
businesses with a United States nexus. As demonstrated by the
heartfelt testimony of the class members themselves at the final
approval hearing in the Swiss Banks litigation, the utilization of group
action in a judicial tribunal to obtain recognition and compensation of
claims may be unique to American law. 17
16. See, e.g., Nazi Era, 198 F.R.D. 429, 431-436, describing the history of the negotiations
and the role of the United States in the negotiations, including the declaration of Stuart E.
Eizenstat and the letter of President William J. Clinton. The Nazi Era negotiations also
included the governments of Germany, Austria, Israel, Belarus, Poland, Russia, Ukraine, and
the Czech Republic. The Conference on Jewish Material Claims Against Germany, an umbrella
organization representing many international Jewish non-governmental organizations, was also
involved. 198 F.R.D. at 431-432. The Swiss Banks settlement approval decision likewise lists
the key players, including Stuart Eizenstat and former Senator Alfonse D'Amato. Other
organizations playing important roles in the Swiss Banks settlement are listed at 105 F. Supp.
2d 139, 147-149 (E.D.N.Y. 2000). For one point of view on the negotiations, from a
survivor/journalist perspective, see generally John Authers & Richard Wolffe, THE VICTIM'S
FORTUNE: INSIDE THE EPic BATTLE OVER THE DEBTS OF THE HOLOCAUST (2002).
17. As stated by Israel Singer, Executive Director of the Conference on Jewish Material
Claims Against Germany:
Let me raise one point and with that I'll close. I ask you to consider one fact and one
fact above all. As a result of this case, 5.4 million names of persons who died in the
Holocaust came to light, names of the people, the places which they were killed in.
This has changed history, because people can no longer claim that people didn't die.
Holocaust revisionists can no longer claim that people didn't pass from the scene.
This historic point changes the way the picture of history plays out and the way the
future will play itself out. We did that as a result of the efforts of this trial, which
turned out to be a settlement, because we found those names as a result of the fact
that we wanted to know which people had accounts.
In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 105 F. Supp. 2d 139, 143 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (No. CV-96-4849)
(on file with the author) [hereinafter Fairness Hearing Transcript]. As class member Judith
Hager testified at the same hearing:
Again, I want to thank United States for this great opportunity she gave people to
speak out. It's not a matter of how much pennies or how much dollars or how much
millions you have; it's the great opportunity to speak out, even 55 years later, and I
think that even 1,000 years later, our generations to come will continue to speak and




II. THE HUMAN RIGHTS/MASS TORT PRECURSORS TO THE HOLOCAUST
LITIGATION
The Holocaust cases were not entirely sui generis. The way for
the court-sponsored resolution of the Holocaust cases was paved by a
notable precursor, In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litigation, a
multinational class action brought under the Alien Tort Claims Act' 8
("ATCA"), certified under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, tried to a
verdict on a classwide basis, and affirmed on appeal. 19
The Marcos litigation was prosecuted on behalf of
approximately ten thousand victims who suffered torture,
disappearance, or summary execution at the hands of the Marcos
regime.20 Judge Manuel Real of the United States District Court for
the Central District of California served as MDL transferee judge in
this consolidated litigation, which was transferred for pretrial
proceedings and trial to the District of Hawaii. 21
In Hilao v. Estate of Marcos,22 the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
district court's judgment approving the jury verdicts in a three-phase
trial structure that determined the liability of the estate of Ferdinand
Marcos to a class of ten thousand persons tortured, summarily
executed, or "disappeared" while in military custody during the
fourteen year period of Marcos' dictatorial regime. 23
The district court ordered the issues of liability and damages
tried separately. 24 In September 1992, a jury trial was held on
liability, and the jury reached a verdict against the estate. The
district court then ordered the damage trial bifurcated into one trial
on exemplary damages, to be followed by a separate trial on
compensatory damages. Before these trials commenced, the court
gave notice to the class and set a proof-of-claim deadline. A total of
18. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2004) [hereinafter ATCA] ("The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of
nations or a treaty of the United States."). The ATCA was enacted in 1789, as part of the first
Judiciary Act.
19. 910 F. Supp. 1460, 1464 (D. Haw. 1995), aff'd sub nom Hilao v. Estate of Marcos,
103 F.3d 767, 770 (9th Cir. 1996).
20. 910 F. Supp. 1460, 1462-64.
21. In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litig., 910 F. Supp. at 1460, 1463.
22. 103 F.3d 767 (9th Cir. 1996).
23. Id. at 774.




10,059 verified claim forms were returned. In the end, 9,541 of these
claims were found valid.
25
In February 1994, the same jury that had heard the liability
phase of the trial heard evidence on exemplary damages and returned
a verdict against the Marcos estate in the amount of $1.2 billion. 26
The district court appointed a Special Master to examine the claims
that had been submitted by class members, interview a sample of
claimants, and make a report and recommendation to the jury in
connection with the third, compensatory damages trial phase.27 In
January 1995, the jury reconvened for the third time. After a seven-
day trial, the jury returned a compensatory damage award in the
aggregate amount of over $766 million for the class. 2
8
The procedure utilized to obtain data and present evidence on
compensatory damages is described in greater detail in the district
court's opinion, in which Judge Real upheld the propriety of using
aggregate procedures, including the random sampling of claims and
the use of inferential statistics and extrapolation to calculate damages
for each member of the class. 29 The utilization of these techniques,
under the particular circumstances presented by the Marcos litigation,
was upheld by the Ninth Circuit. 30
To obtain classwide damages data, the court-appointed head
Special Master (Sol Schreiber, a well-recognized retired federal
magistrate judge) supervised the taking of formal depositions of 137
randomly selected claimants. The Special Master then reviewed the
claim forms and depositions of the class members in the sample and
recommended the amount of damages to be awarded to each of the 131
claimants in this sample whose samples were determined to be valid.
The Special Master applied Philippine, international, and American
law on damages, using a valuation protocol that included specific
factors for consideration in each case. These factors included the
occurrence or absence of physical torture, the duration of any torture,
the length of detention, mental abuse, the victim's age, and actual
losses, including medical bills. 31
25. The procedural background of the district court litigation, and the trial and notice
procedures are summarized at In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litig., 910 F. Supp. at 1460,
1461-1464, 1466-1469; and at Hilao, 103 F.3d at 767, 782-785.
26. In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litig., 910 F. Supp. at 1464; Hilao, 103 F.3d at
772.
27. In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litig., 910 F. Supp. at 1464; Hilao, 103 F.3d at
767, 772.
28. Id. at 772.
29. In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litig., 910 F. Supp. at 1464-65.
30. Hilao, 103 F.3d at 784-87.
31. Id. at 783.
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For the summary execution and disappearance claims, the
Special Master considered the presence or absence of torture prior to
death or disappearance, the actual killing or disappearance, the
mental anguish suffered by the victim's family, and lost earnings.
32
Any monetary loss was computed according to a formula established
by the Philippine Supreme Court and converted into American
dollars.
33
This procedure enabled the Special Master to recommend
damages for the entire sample by multiplying the average claim in
each category by the number of claimants in that sample. From there,
the Special Master extrapolated each sample award to reach an
aggregate award for each of the three types of claims (torture,
summary execution, and disappearance) as well as an aggregate
amount for the entire class.34 The Special Master recommended a
total compensatory damage award of $767,491,493. 35
The jury trial on compensatory damages included the expert
testimony of a statistician regarding the validity of the methodology
used to select the random sample. The expert opined "that the
procedures followed conform to the standards of inferential statistics,
and that the injuries of the random sample claimants were
representative of the class as a whole."36  The jury considered the
testimony of the 137 random-sample claimants, as well as the Special
Master's testimony regarding his report and recommendations, which
were supplied to the jury. 37
The jury was instructed that it could accept, modify, or reject
the Special Master's recommendations and that it could
independently, on the basis of the evidence presented by the
random-sample claimants, reach its own judgment as to the actual
damages of those claimants, as well as the actual damages of the class
as a whole.38 The jury deliberated for five days, ultimately reaching a
verdict that adopted the Special Master's recommendations in most,
but not all, instances.
39
In approving the three-phase trial structure and the use of both
random sampling and extrapolative techniques to calculate class
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 783.
35. Id. at 783-84.
36. Id.
37. In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litig., 910 F. Supp. at 1464.
38. Hilao, 103 F.3d at 784.
39. Id.
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damages, Judge Real articulated a compelling interest in avoiding the
cost, waste, delay, and inconsistency of ten thousand individual trials:
In a case such as this one, where there are 9,541 class members, most of whom live in
other areas of the world, a balancing of interests must occur to obtain justice to the
parties. A due process analysis must weigh defendant's claim to the right to trial in
each individual case against judicial economy and manageability by use of a valid
statistical procedure. . . . Due process is not necessarily limited to the traditional sense
as argued by defendants, 'but should encompass the impact on plaintiffs and even the
obvious societal interests involved.' . . . Here, individual trials for each of the
9,541 plaintiffs would take decades. Most of that time would be wasted since the nature
of the injuries would be similar, if not identical, the testimony would be largely
duplicative. Utilizing the procedure employed by the Court the injuries could be
accurately categorized, and the source of the injuries would be identical. . . . This Court
believes, the aggregate trial is, in some vital respect, superior to the individual trial and
does not violate the substantive or procedural due process rights of either the plaintiffs
or the defendant.
40
Judge Real adopted his due process analysis from that utilized
by then-Chief Judge Robert M. Parker of the Eastern District of Texas
in a non-human rights context-the management of thousands of
similar asbestos personal injury cases consolidated in the Eastern
District of Texas. 4' The Marcos statistical sampling methodology
borrowed from and refined that developed in Cimino. Ironically,
Cimino itself did not fair as well on appeal as did Marcos: years after
Judge Parker certified the Cimino class and endorsed the statistical
methodology (and after Judge Parker himself was elevated to the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals), the Fifth Circuit reversed much of the
Cimino decision.
42
The Ninth Circuit, however, endorsed Judge Real's rationale,
stating that:
the time and judicial resource required to try the nearly 10,000 claims in this case would
alone make resolution of [plaintiffs'] claims impossible. . . . The similarity in the
injuries suffered by many of the class members would make such an effort, even if it
could be undertaken, especially wasteful, as would the fact that the district court found
early on that the damages suffered by the class members likely exceed the total known
assets of the estate.
4 3
The district court concluded, and the Ninth Circuit confirmed,
that the use of inferential statistics and aggregate procedures did not
deny defendants their constitutional due process right to a one-on-one
trial.44 Both Marcos decisions performed the balancing test set forth
40. In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litig., 910 F. Supp. at 1467 (citations and
footnotes omitted).
41. Cimino v. Raymark Indus., 751 F. Supp. 649, 665-66 (E.D. Tex. 1990).
42. Cimino v. Raymark Indus., 151 F.3d 297, 319-20 (5th Cir. 1998).
43. Hilao, 103 F.3d at 786.
44. In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litig., 910 F. Supp. at 1467; Hilao, 103 F.3d at
786.
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by the Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge45 and Connecticut v.
Doehr46 to determine that the three-phase trial procedure utilized by
the district court, including the determination of an aggregate
punitive damages award prior to the compensatory damages trial
and the use of sampling, extrapolative, and aggregate techniques, did
not violate due process.
47
The Ninth Circuit took comfort from the care with which the
sampling and calculation procedure was designed, the integrity of the
process as implemented, the deduction for invalid claims, and from the
fact that the proof-of-claim forms "the district court required each
class member to submit in order to opt into the class required the
claimant to certify under penalty of perjury that the information
provided was true and correct."
48
In weighing and balancing the defendant's claimed right to a
jury trial in each individual case against the judicial economy and
manageability of a phased class trial utilizing valid statistical
procedures, both Marcos courts concluded that only the aggregate
techniques protected the due process rights of both sides. 49 Had the
trial court reverted to individualized trials, most class members either
would have died before the inception of their trial or would have had
their day in court only after the exhaustion of the assets of the estate.
As the district court observed, invocation of the Seventh Amendment
to insist on multiple jury trials and thus "to deny relief to persons who
have suffered significant damage simply based of the number of
persons a single tort feasor has hurt is unconscionable.
50
Thus, as the district court concluded, "the aggregate trial is, in
some vital respects, superior to the individual trial and does not
violate the substantive or procedural rights of either the plaintiffs or
45. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) ("[D]ue process generally requires consideration of three
distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the
risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable
value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.").
46. 501 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1991) (applying the Mahews factors).
47. In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litig., 910 F. Supp. at 1467-69; Hilao, 103 F.3d
785-87.
48. Hilao, 103 F.3d at 786.
49. See In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litig., 910 F. Supp. 1460, 1467: 'This Court
believes 'the aggregate trial is, in some respects, superior to the individual trial' and does not
violate the substantive or due process rights of either the plaintiffs or the defendant."; see also
Hilao, 103 F.3d 767, 786-787.
50. In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litig., 910 F. Supp. at 1468 n.19.
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the defendant." 51  The Ninth Circuit similarly observed that the
plaintiffs' interest in the use of the statistical method was "enormous,
since adversarial resolution of each class member's claim would pose
insurmountable practical hurdles. The 'ancillary' interest of the
judiciary in the procedure is obviously also substantial, since 9,541
individual adversarial determinations of claim validity would clog the
docket of the district court for years."52
The Marcos litigation provides the first example of the design,
implementation, and affirmance on appeal of a multi-phase class trial
structure that incorporated statistical sampling and extrapolative
techniques that generated a monetary judgment favorable to the class.
Appellate courts have since considered the Marcos sampling
methodology in other class action contexts.5 3
Satisfaction of the approximately $2 billion Marcos verdict,
reduced to final judgment in 1995, has proved elusive: collection
efforts against the Marcos defendants continue, and the assets remain
beyond reach in (ironically) Swiss banks. The plaintiff class members
and their counsel remain unpaid.54 Nonetheless, the Marcos litigation
established Rule 23 as a feasible procedural device to unite the claims
of thousands, or hundreds of thousands, of victims of human rights
violations, allowing effective representative litigation in United States
courts. It also legitimized the utilization of statistical sampling
techniques to extrapolate classwide damages from a valid sample of
the class, thus facilitating the use of class actions in more mundane
mass torts and other class actions.
The Marcos litigation proved widely influential on mass tort
and other class actions without human rights dimensions. Courts
51. Id. at 1467 (quoting Michael J. Saks & Peter David Blank, Justice Improved: The
Unrecognized Benefits of Aggregation and Sampling in Mass Torts, 44 STAN. L. REV. 815, 827
(1992)).
52. Id.
53 For example, in Bell v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 115 Cal. App. 4th 715 (Cal. App.
2004), the California Court of Appeal upheld the propriety of statistical sampling to determine
the aggregate damages of a certified "wage and hour" employee class action (in which employees
claimed to have been required to work substantial - yet varying - amounts of unpaid
overtime), after the issue of liability had been decided on summary judgment in the trial court.
As the Bell court held, inter alia, "the use of random sampling and extrapolation for the
determination of aggregate classwide damages was proper. The proof of aggregate damages for
time-and-a-half overtime by statistical inference reflected a level of accuracy consistent with due
process." 115 Cal. App. 4th at 747-752.
54. The Banks successfully reversed the district court's assets freeze orders in Credit
Suisse v. U.S. District Court, 130 F.3d 1342 (9th Cir. 1997). In the most recent chapter of the
Marcos saga, the Philippine National Bank successfully petitioned the Ninth Circuit for writ of
mandamus vacating the district court's contempt and discovery orders regarding the Bank's
transfer of assets to the Republic of the Philippines, under the act of state doctrine. Philippine
Nat'l Bank v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 397 F.3d 768 (9th Cir. 2005).
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searching for manageable structures within which to conduct phased,
classwide trials in "routine" mass tort and employment litigation
looked to the example set by the Marcos litigation. For example, the
California state courts used a variation of the statistical sampling
technique described in Marcos in the trial of an employees' wage and
hour class action against an insurance company. The classwide trial
is described, and was affirmed, by the California Court of Appeal in
Bell v. Farmers Insurance Exchange.55 In granting nationwide class
certification to a plaintiffs' class of cigarette smokers suffering from
diagnosed tobacco-related diseases, for purposes of a unitary
adjudication of their punitive damages claims against the tobacco
companies in the group of cases known as the Simon litigation, Judge
Weinstein of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York cited from Marcos in addressing the use of statistics to determine
the level of classwide harm caused by a specific list of diseases.
56
Are the Swiss Banks, Nazi-Era, and Marcos cases prototypes or
precursors of a new wave of hybrid human rights mass torts litigation
that merges the law of nations and common law as its substantive
content and utilizes the class action procedures and expansive
jurisdiction presently available in U.S. courts to create a new body of
compensatory litigation? It may be that the success of these cases
(pragmatically defined here as substantial court-approved or endorsed
settlements, or substantial jury verdicts affirmed on appeal) owe as
much, or more, to the political climate of their time, and to the judicial
philosophies of the judges who presided over them, than to the
"objective" merit of the claims or their cognizance as legal claims
per se. The active support and involvement of the federal government
surely was critical to the resolution, rather than the dismissal, of the
Holocaust cases. Where such support is not forthcoming, or where the
attitude of the government is neutral or openly hostile, courts may not
55. 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 544, 721-24 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004), reh'g denied, Civ. Act. Nos. A096721,
A097810, A098799, 2004 Cal. App. LEXIS 298 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 9, 2004).
56. In re Simon II Litig., 211 F.R.D. 86, 151 (E.D.N.Y. 2002). The Simon II class
certification decision is currently on appeal, pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 23(f), to the Second
Circuit. The class certification decision itself was preceded by precedent of a comprehensive
decision approving on choice of law, Simon v. Philip Morris, Inc., 124 F. Supp. 2d 46 (E.D.N.Y.
2000), and a decision of an appropriate multiclass trialtime structure for the case. Simon v.
Philip Morris, Inc., 200 F.R.D. 21 (E.D.N.Y. 2001). The Simon II decision, despite its own
uncertain destiny, has articulated principles that have proved influential on other courts: the
California Supreme Court cited it for the proposition that aggregate proof in class actions (such
as had been pioneered in Marcos) is consistent with defendants' constitutional rights. Say-On
Drug Stores, Inc. v. Supreme Court, 34 Cal. 4th 319, 333 n.6 (2004); as did the California Court of
Appeal in Bell v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 115 Cal. App. 4th 715, 752 (2004). Say-On Drug Stores
and Bell are "wage and hour" employment class actions.
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be as bold in sustaining claims long enough to allow other forces to
gain sufficient leverage to press for compensatory settlements or
survive to the point of jury trials.
For example, cases brought on behalf of other World War II era
victims have not fared as well as the Holocaust cases: class actions
filed by Japanese slave laborers, for example, have been dismissed on
various grounds. In Deutsch v. Turner Corp., for example, the Ninth
Circuit affirmed the judgment of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California dismissing actions brought against
numerous Japanese corporations for damages for lost wages and for
atrocious injuries suffered in the course of their forced labor during
the Second World War.57 This litigation involved claims brought
under a California statute, California Civil Procedure Code Section
354.6,58 which was determined by the federal court to be an
unconstitutional intrusion by the state on the federal government's
exclusive power to make and resolve war, including the procedure for
57. In re World War II Era Japanese Forced Labor Litig., 164 F. Supp. 2d 1153, 1160 (N.D.
Cal. 2001), aff'd sub nom. Deutsch v. Turner Corp., 317 F.3d 1005, 1030 (9th Cir. 2003).
58. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 354.6 (West 2004):
(a) As used in this section:
(1) "Second World War slave labor victim" means any person taken from a
concentration camp or ghetto or diverted from transportation to a concentration camp
or from a ghetto to perform labor without pay for any period of time between 1929 and
1945, by the Nazi regime, its allies and sympathizers, or enterprises transacting
business in any of the areas occupied by or under control of the Nazi regime or its
allies or sympathizers.
(2) "Second World War forced labor victim" means any person who was a member of
the civilian population conquered by the Nazi regime, its allies or sympathizers, or
prisoner-of-war of the Nazi regime, its allies or sympathizers, forced to perform labor
without pay for any period of time between 1929 and 1945, by the Nazi regime, its
allies and sympathizers, or enterprises transacting business in any of the areas
occupied by or under control of the Nazi regime or its allies and sympathizers.
(3) "Compensation" means the present value of wages and benefits that individuals
should have been paid and damages for injuries sustained in connection with the
labor performed. Present value shall be calculated on the basis of the market value of
the services at the time they were performed, plus interest from the time the services
were performed, compounded annually to date of full payment without diminution for
wartime or postwar currency devaluation.
(b) Any Second World War slave labor victim, or heir of a Second World War slave
labor victim, Second World War forced labor victim, or heir of a Second World War
forced labor victim, may bring an action to recover compensation for labor performed
as a Second World War slave labor victim or Second World War forced labor victim
from any entity or successor in interest thereof, for whom that labor was performed,
either directly or through a subsidiary or affiliate. That action may be brought in a
superior court of this state, which court shall have jurisdiction over that action until
its completion or resolution.
(c) Any action brought under this section shall not be dismissed for failure to comply
with the applicable statute of limitation, if the action is commenced on or before
December 31, 2010.
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the resolution of war claims. 59 California's Section 354.6 was enacted
in 1999 to extend statutes of limitations on claims by victims of Nazi
persecution for forced or slave labor.60 The statute itself was not
limited to victims of Nazi persecution, but referred to all Second World
War forced labor victims. 61 The statute was declared unconstitutional
in the federal courts and received a mixed reception in California state
courts.
6 2
Divorced from the context of wartime atrocity, a variety of
cases claiming injuries from pharmaceutical experiments on non-
consenting subjects, from environmental depredations, and for
violations of the ATCA, have been dismissed by federal courts on
forum non conveniens grounds. 63 The ATCA itself was at risk, in the
2003-2004 Supreme Court Term, in Sosa v. Humberto Alvarez-
Machain,64 as business interests who feared accountability in U.S.
courts for their overseas torts sought to restrict its historically broad
(and long unappreciated and underutilized) reach.
The ATCA has been invoked rarely. As Justice Souter wrote
for the majority in Sosa, " 'no one seems to know whence it came'...
and for over 170 years after its enactment it provided jurisdiction in
59. In re World War II Era Japanese Forced Labor Litig., 164 F. Supp. 2d at 1176.
60. CAL. CIV. PROC. § 354.6(c) (West 2005).
61. § 354.6(a)(1)-(2).
62. Compare Taiheiyo Cement Corp. v. Superior Court, 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 451, 459, 461, 470
(Cal. Ct. App. 2003) vacated, Taiheiyo Cement Corp. v. Superior Court, 117 Cal. App. 4th 380,
398 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that Section 354.6 satisfies the due process clause as applied to
claims against a Japanese corporation by a Korean national and the claim is not preempted
under the supremacy clause or the federal purposes and policies embodied in the Treaty of Peace
with Japan, entered into on September 8, 1951), with Mitsubishi Materials Corp. v. Superior
Court, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 159, 163 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that Section 354.6 is
unconstitutional under the supremacy clause). The Taiheiyo case has been depublished and is
under California Supreme Court review.
63. See, e.g., Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d 470 (2nd Cir. 2002) (claims of environmental
damage and personal injuries brought by citizens of Peru and Ecuador against a United States
oil company dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds).
64. 124 S. Ct. 2739 (2004). The case has a long, convoluted history, beginning in 1985 when
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agent Enrique Camarena-Salazar was captured on
assignment in Mexico, taken to Guadalajara, tortured and interrogated for two days, then
murdered. Id. at 2746. DEA officials charged Mexican physician Umberto Alvarez-Machain
with acting to prolong agent Camarena's life in order to extend his interrogation and torture. Id.
To bring Alvarez to justice, the DEA hired petitioner Jose Francisco Sosa to abduct Alvarez and
bring him to Texas, where he was arrested. Id. The case was tried in 1992, and ended in a
directed judgment of acquittal. Id. Thereafter, Alvarez sued Sosa, the United States, several
DEA agents, and others, under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1),
and sued Sosa under the ATCA. Id. at 2747. In Sosa, the Supreme Court reversed judgments
upholding the availability of remedies for Sosa himself under the FTCA and the ATCA but did
not categorically invalidate the use of either of these statutes by aliens under other factual or
legal circumstances. Id. at 2753, 2761-62.
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only one case."65 In Sosa, the Supreme Court delineated the scope of
the ATCA, rejecting the argument that "the statute does no more than
vest federal courts with jurisdiction, neither creating nor authorizing
the courts to recognize any particular right of action without further
congressional action."66  While the ATCA is, in its terms, only
jurisdictional, the Supreme Court concluded that, at the time of its
enactment, the jurisdiction established by the ATCA empowered
federal courts "to hear claims in a very limited category defined by the
law of nations and recognized at common law."67 The Sosa decision
gathered the existing jurisprudence and commentary on the history of
the ATCA, the historical and political context from which it emerged,
and the various academic and legal positions regarding its scope and
application. International human rights advocates have cause to be
cautiously encouraged by the Sosa decision, which does not
categorically foreclose the prosecution of international law violations
as torts in the United States courts. The specific violations that will
support an ACTA claim in the wake of Sosa were generally described,
but not themselves specified, in the Sosa decision: this jurisprudence
has yet to fully evolve.
The Sosa decision provides general guidance on the types of
international law violations that will qualify as ATCA torts. The key
to the Supreme Court's approach in Sosa is the development of
historical knowledge regarding "the interaction between the [ATCA]
at the time of its enactment and the ambient law of the era."68 At its
founding, the United States recognized the law of nations as it then
existed. According to the historians and commentators whose views
were credited by the Supreme Court in Sosa, the late eighteenth
Century "law of nations comprised two principal elements, the first
covering the general norms governing the behavior of national states
with each other . . . [and the] second, more pedestrian element,...
[the] body of judge-made law regulating the conduct of individuals
situated outside domestic boundaries and consequently carrying an
international savor."
69
This second element, essentially an international mercantile
common law or "law merchant emerged from the customary practices
65. 124 S.Ct. at 2755 (quoting Judge Friendly in IT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015
(2d Cir. 1975)). Judge Friendly also described the ATCA as a "legal Lohengrin." IT, 519 F.2d at
1015.
66. 124 S. Ct. at 2754.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 2755.
69. Id. at 2756.
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of international traders. "7o As Sosa notes, "the sparse
contemporaneous cases and legal materials referring to the AT[CA]
tend to confirm ... that some, but few, torts in violation of the law of
nations were understood to be within the common law. ' 71  One
historical example recounted in Sosa is the 1795 opinion of Attorney
General William Bradford, who had been asked whether criminal
prosecution was available against Americans who had taken part in
the French plunder of the British slave colony in Sierra Leone. 72 The
Supreme Court summed up its decision in Sosa by holding that,
although the ATCA is a jurisdictional statute that creates no new
causes of action, the reasonable inference from its historical context is
that the ATCA was intended to have practical effect the moment it
became law. "The jurisdictional grant is best read as having been
enacted on the understanding that the common law would provide a
cause of action for the modest number of international law violations
with a potential for personal liability at the time."7 3 Yet the problem
remains as to how to apply this formula to violations of a law of
nations that has evolved greatly since 1789. On this, Sosa strikes a
note of caution: "We think courts should require any claim based on
the present-day law of nations to rest on a norm of international
character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity
comparable to the features of the 18th-Century paradigms we have
recognized."
74
Thus, while the incidents that gave rise to the Sosa litigation
involved detention, torture, and killing (which Sosa notes are
categories of conduct clearly violative of established international
law), the circumstances of these particular episodes, which were not
proven to compromise formally sanctioned, governmentally organized,
systematic and long term policies, were held to fall short of the
"paradigms" Sosa requires. 75  In short, the outer bounds of the
70. Id.
71. Id. at 2759.
72. Id. (quoting Bradford's opinion, 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 57, 59 (1795), which indicated the
availability of the federal courts for the prosecution of tort litigation arising from the episode:
"that there can be no doubt that the company or individuals who have been injured by these acts
of hostility have a remedy by a civil suit in the courts of the United States; jurisdiction being
expressly given to these courts in all cases where an alien sues for a tort only, in violation of the
laws of nations, or a treaty of the United States ...." (emphasis in original)).
73. Id. at 2761.
74. Id. at 2761-62.
75. The Sosa discussion of this distinction is illuminating:
the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States (1987), says in
its discussion of customary international human rights law that a 'state violates
international law if, as a matter of state policy, it practices, encourages, or
222720041
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offenses the United States courts would and should accept as
violations of established international law and which "in the present,
and perfect world ... expresses an aspiration that exceeds any binding
customary rule having the specificity we require"76 remains to be
tested as human rights violations cases proceed in the courts. 77
III. DOING JUSTICE BY BEARING WITNESS
The Marcos, Swiss Banks, and Nazi-Era cases were,
essentially, tort cases seeking compensatory and punitive damages for
the personal injuries, wrongful deaths, false imprisonments, and
economic losses of the plaintiffs. Tort claims for damages were
asserted because injunctive, equitable, or prophylactic relief could not,
as a practical matter, be obtained. Thus, these cases embody a
poignant paradox: when it came time to settle the Swiss Banks and
Nazi-Era cases, the class representatives and their counsel knew that
they could not, in good conscience, present the proposed settlements as
fulfilling the requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e) that
the settlements be "fair, adequate and reasonable."78  No amount of
compensation, even damages measured in the billions, could serve as a
"fair," "adequate," or "reasonable" measure of justice in light of the
genocidal wrongs committed.7 9 Indeed, critics claimed the prosecution
of the suits themselves dishonored the victims or trivialized their
suffering by attempting to translate moral wrongs into monetary
condones ... prolonged arbitrary detention.' . . . Although the Restatement does not
explain its requirements of a 'state policy' and of 'prolonged' detention, the implication
is clear. Any credible invocation of a principle against arbitrary detention that the
civilized world accepts as binding customary international law requires a factual basis
beyond relatively brief detention in excess of positive authority. Even though
Restatement's limits are only the beginning of the enquiry, because although it is easy
to say that some policies of prolonged arbitrary detentions are so bad that those who
enforce them become enemies of the human race, it may be harder to say which
policies cross that line with the certainty afforded by Blackstone's three common law
offenses. In any event, the label would never fit the reckless policeman who botches
his warrant, even though that same officer might pay damages under municipal law.
Id. at 2768-69 (citations omitted).
76. Id. at 2769.
77. Plaintiffs seeking redress for human rights abuses have invoked other U.S. statutes as
well. In June 2004, for example, a class action was filed against U.S. civilian contractors on
behalf of alleged torture and abuse victims at the now notorious Abu Ghraib Prison. The
lawsuit, Sami Abbas Al Rawi v. Titan Corporation, Case No. 04-CV-1143 (S.D. Cal. June 2004)
asserts Civil RICO claims as well as ATCA claims, violations of the Geneva Conventions, and
common law torts.
78. MANUAL OF COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 21.634 (2004) (quoting In re Gen. Motors
Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 785 (3d Cir. 1995)).
79. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(1)(C) ("The court may approve a settlement, voluntary dismissal, or
compromise that would bind class members only after a hearing and on finding that the
settlement, voluntary dismissal, or compromise is fair, reasonable, and adequate.").
2228
2004] HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 2229
claims.80 The proponents of these settlements acknowledged their
fundamental inadequacy.8 1 They emphasized, instead, the necessity of
obtaining, through compensation, that measure of recognition that the
law could achieve. In wise and anguished decisions, cited above, the
district courts approved these settlements, thus empowering the
victims as agents of justice and anointing the American courts as
places of hope.
The members of the five settlement classes certified in the
Swiss Banks litigation were dispersed throughout the world.8 2 A
uniquely ambitious and creative plan of notification was called for,
both as a practical matter and to fulfill the due process requirements
inherent in the American class action mechanism.8 3 The worldwide
class required worldwide notice. The notice plan, described by Judge
Korman in his Swiss Banks final settlement approval decision
8 4
holding that the plan "satisfied due process requirements and Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c),"8 5 was implemented by four notice
administrators (some of whom donated a substantial portion of their
services).8 6 The plan utilized direct mail to all known potential class
80. See Authers & Wolffe, supra note 16, at 350-352.
81. Rabbi Morris Schmidman, a class member, spoke thus at the Fairness Hearing:
The words fair, just, reasonable, equitable have no real meaning when applied to the
Holocaust. There needs to be a new terminology, a new set of words, a new definition
that could adequately comport to what the Holocaust meant to our time and to the
history of mankind. But until that is created, having to live with the terminology that
exists, we endorse this proposal as being real, even if it is not the ideal.
Fairness Hearing Transcript at 59:25-60:7. Another class member, Alice Fisher, said:
so this is not a fair deal, considering for how many people they did it. Anyhow, as you
heard here, this is not just a material issue; this is a moral issue. And the moral side
of it is that at least this hearing is a part of the moral side of it. This puts the
Holocaust on the map against all the denials. So with this, I am satisfied, at least,
that my parents and brothers' memory will not be assaulted like they were.
Fairness Hearing Transcript at 119:8-16.
82. 105 F. Supp. 2d 139, 144-145.
83. See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313-319 (1950) (due
process). The requirements of "best practices" in the settlement context are discussed in
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) (2004) §§ 21.312 and 21.633. Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(e)(1)(B) requires the Court to "direct notice in a reasonable manner to all class
members who would be bound by a proposed settlement...." Methodologies may include mailed
notice when feasible, print publication, posting in public places, and internet notice. MANUAL,
§ 21.311. The Swiss Banks notice plan is described and endorsed in the MANUAL at page 287,
n.881.
84. In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig.,105 F. Supp. 2d 139, 144-145 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
85. Id. at 144.
86. The notification firms of Poorman Douglas Corporation, Hillsoft Communications,
Kinsella Communications, and AB Data implemented the international notice program, donating
a substantial part of their services to secure the success of this uniquely ambitious project.
Fairness Hearing Transcript 5:9-7:25.
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members, worldwide publication in national, regional, and local
media, public relations (including television and radio interviews), the
internet, and grassroots community outreach. More than 1.4 million
copies of the notice package were mailed directly to potential class
members in at least forty-eight countries.87 Judge Korman held two
sessions of fairness hearings: the first in his courtroom in Brooklyn,
New York, on November 29, 1999 and the second in Israel on
December 14, 1999.88 Judge Korman conducted and presided over the
supplemental fairness hearing in Israel by electronic hookup, which
was open to a random sampling of Israelis who had submitted Initial
Questionnaires in response to the notice.8 9 The proposed settlement
garnered the overwhelming support of the class. In comparison to the
over 550,000 Initial Questionnaires that were received, the court
received a mere 243 communications that could be characterized as
objections to the settlement and only 401 opt-out requests, some of
which were later withdrawn, and others of which were turned in by
persons who were not class members. 90 A wide array of Jewish and
Holocaust survivors' organizations likewise endorsed the settlement. 91
As Judge Korman noted, the President of the Polish Association of
Roma, Roman Kwiatkowski, appeared at the settlement fairness
hearing specifically to express his appreciation for the fact that "this
time, nobody forgot about us."
92
87. Swiss Banks, 105 F. Supp. 2d 139, 145.
88. Id.
89. The settlement plan relied upon class members to return Initial Questionnaires to
provide information and recommend proposals for allocation of the settlement fund. Over
550,000 class members returned these Initial Questionnaires. Swiss Banks, 105 F. Supp. 2d at
147.
90. Id.
91. Id. (listing some of these entities).
92. Swiss Banks, 105 F. Supp. 2d 139, 147. The Transcript of Fairness Hearing Transcript
states in detail:
During the Holocaust, half a million Romas lost their lives. Although they were
wanderers, they also were owners of their properties. We received information from
the media that the Romas were included in the settlement. In connection with that,
we invested plenty of effort to inform all of the Roman areas about this case. We are
very happy to know that this time, nobody forgot about us. Thank you.
Fairness Hearing, November 29, 1999 Transcript at 144-45. The Third Reich singled out the
Romani peoples ("Roma" or "Sinti," colloquially termed "gypsies") for early extermination. The
Nazi genocide against the Roma and Sinti people has gone essentially unreported. The Swiss
Banks litigation recognized the equal stature of the Roma victims of the Nazi persecution and
gave them separate settlement class status in recognition. This recognition, in turn, led to
activism by, and on behalf of, the Roma people in ongoing Holocaust-related legislation. There is
Roma-initiated litigation against IBM in Switzerland, the site of the company's European
headquarters, alleging that IBM machines enabled Adolph Hitler to identify and send 600,000
Roma to their deaths. BAZYLER, HOLOCAUST JUSTICE, supra note 12, at 302-03. The Bazyler
book details the allegations that IBM techniques and technology facilitated Nazi genocide. Id.
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The Clinton Administration's Justice and State Departments
actively participated in settlement negotiations and supported the
Holocaust settlements. Judge Korman duly noted the participation
and endorsement of the United States government in his Swiss Banks
settlement approval decision as follows:
The United States, which participated actively in settlement discussions over a period of
many months, through Deputy Treasury Secretary Eizenstat, has expressed its
"unqualified support for the parties' class action settlement" and endorsed it "as fair,
reasonable and adequate and unquestionably in the public interest." Transcript of
Fairness Hearing (Nov. 29, 1999) at 27 (comments of James Gilligan, U.S. Department
of Justice, on behalf of the United States). Mr. Gilligan continued as follows:
"The United States supports approval of the settlement the parties have reached. It is
fair and just and promotes the public interest, as expressed in the policy that the United
States government has pursued for the past four years. Because the parties reached for
common ground rather than prolong their difference[s], the elderly victims of the
Holocaust will receive the benefits of this settlement in their lifetime and much more
quickly than would have been possible had the litigation continued.
But of equal importance, the United States regards this settlement as an excellent
example of how cooperation and the will to fulfill a moral obligation can lead to
voluntary resolution of disputes over Holocaust-era claims."
9 3
The Clinton Administration viewed additional Holocaust
litigation settlements as in the best interests of the United States and
as matters for active pursuit rather than mere acquiescence. Indeed,
the United States openly expressed its opinion and prediction that
approval of the Swiss Banks settlement would lead to an equally
massive, or even larger settlement, in the related Nazi Era cases.94 As
Judge Korman acknowledged:
The government anticipates that the settlement here, by force of its example, will
promote the U.S. policy of negotiated settlement in other cases and countries where
Holocaust victims' claims for restitution have not yet been resolved. In particular, the
United States is hopeful that this settlement will add a sense of urgency and possibility
Whether or not those specific allegations are ultimately proven, the recognition of the Roma and
Sinti people as a persecuted victim class in the Swiss Banks litigation demonstrates the moral
and historical value of human rights litigation in creating and preserving an official and public
record that bears durable witness to atrocities, so that neither the atrocities themselves nor their
human victims shall ever be forgotten.
93. In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 105 F. Supp. 2d 139, 148 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
94. Id. (quoting James Gilligan, U.S. Department of Justice, Transcript of Fairness Hearing
Hearings Transcript at 27:
The government anticipates that the settlement here, by force of its example, will
promote the U.S. policy of negotiated settlement in other cases and countries where
Holocaust victims' claims for restitution have not yet been resolved. In particular, the
United States is hopeful that this settlement will add a sense of urgency and
possibility to resolving the pending class action claims of slave and forced laborers
who can no longer wait for years for justice to be done.).
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to resolving the pending class action claims of slave and forced laborers who can no
longer wait for years for justice to be done.
Mr. Gilligan's prediction that the present settlement would serve as a catalyst for a
negotiated agreement of the claims of slave and forced laborers has proven accurate. On
March 23, 2000, a final agreement was reached concerning the allocation of an even
more substantial settlement fund--approximately $5 billion-in a related litigation on
behalf of victims of Nazi slave and forced labor policies, some of whom are also members
of the slave labor classes here.
9 5
The Swiss Banks case settled despite the legal hurdles it faced,
through a miraculous confluence of political, historical and human
forces, catalyzing a recognition of moral responsibility to do all that
was politically and judicially possible to rectify an unspeakable wrong.
Had this confluence not occurred, the Swiss Banks litigation could
well have faced defeat. As another federal judge stated in her opinion
granting final approval to a smaller, related Holocaust settlement that
same year observed:
It goes without saying that the events which form the backdrop of this case make up one
of the darkest periods of man's modern history. Those persecuted by the Nazis were the
victims of unspeakable acts of inhumanity. At the same time, however, it must be
understood that the law is a tool of limited capacity. Not every wrong, even the worst, is
cognizable as a legal claim.
9 6
The prosecution and settlement of the Swiss Banks and Nazi-
Era litigations focused public attention on the atrocities committed
during the Nazi regime and informed or reminded Americans and the
world that many of the victims of these Nazi atrocities had been left
forgotten, ignored, and uncompensated by the various reparations,
programs, and treaties implemented since the end of World War II.
As Judge Bassler, not given to hyperbole, described the Nazi regime:
[t]he German National Socialist ('Nazi') era of the 1930's and 1940's will forever be
remembered for its virtually unparalleled systematic brutality and inhumanity.
Complicit in this bureaucratic barbarism, committed at the time by a modern
industrialized state, were numerous German companies and businesses who employed
slave and forced labor, appropriated private property, and committed other wrongs
against individuals.
9 7
The litigation also bore witness and paid tribute to the
sufferings of the victims, attesting that they were not forgotten. The
settlement approval process itself enabled class members to tell their
stories in court, in formally reported proceedings, with permanent
transcripts. Their personal stories became matters of permanent
public record, accorded the dignity and weight of court testimony.
95. Id. (citations omitted).
96. In re Austrian and German Holocaust Litig., 80 F. Supp. 2d 164, 177 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).




This, in itself, was of tremendous value to many Holocaust survivors
and their family members. It was not the primary purpose of the
litigation, but it became a memorable and valuable benefit of the
lawsuits. We often assume that the function of our civil justice is just
that: to dispense justice. But justice is not done in tribunals; both
criminal and civil litigation operate, at best, to provide limited
retribution or compensation for injustices already done. Justice, or
injustice, is what we do to each other every day. The opportunity for
victims and their families to speak out about the injustices done to
them was, perhaps, the most effective justice that any court system
could provide. Those who spoke, and those whose stories were told, in
open court, in the briefs, and in the pleadings filed in the Swiss Banks
and Nazi-Era litigations can never be forgotten. Their witness is a
refutation and proof of victory over the regime whose overarching goal
was to annihilate and silence them forever. It has been often observed
that "the place of justice is a hallowed place."98 Our courts are truly
hallowed by the merits of the claims entrusted to them for
adjudication or resolution, and they become anointers as well as
anointed when their procedures, such as the class action mechanisms
utilized to effectuate the Swiss Banks settlement, promote justice by
bearing witness.99
A stunning contemporary example of this phenomenon is that
of ongoing pretrial proceedings in the Presbyterian Church of Sudan
Litigation.100 This litigation accuses a Canadian energy company,
98. See, e.g., Myers v. George, 271 F.2d 168, 172 (8th Cir. 1959) (quoting Bacon's essay on
Judicature); Fisher v. McDaniel, 64 P. 1056, 1058 (Wyo. 1901) (same). The phrase is also
attributed to Blackstone: "the very hallowed place of justice," cited in Commonwealth v.
Falkenhan, 452 A. 2d 750, 756 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982). The epigram is carved into the pediment of
the United States Justice Department's headquarters in Washington, D.C.
99. Judge Korman was, for example, well aware of the high degree of moral scrutiny and
expectation applied to every aspect of the Swiss Banks litigation. In denying the Motion for
Reconsideration of the settlement allocation to a disability advocacy group, Judge Korman
characterized the due process challenge to the class action notice, made by the group as a means
to obtain reconsideration of its allotted share, as "frivolous." In re Holocaust Victim Assets
Litigation, 314 F. Supp. 155, 165 (E.D.N.Y. 2004). Delivering this judgment, the Court sternly
intoned:
There is a line from Deuteronomy that reads, 'Justice, justice shall you pursue, that
you may thrive.' Deuteronomy 16:20. Commentators speculate as to why the word
justice is repeated. The answer that I find most appealing is that the repetition
serves as a reminder that, even in the pursuit of a just cause, just means must be
used. See Etz Hayim; TORAH AND COMMENTARY, 1088-89 (David L. Lieber ed., The
Rabbinical Assembly 2001). While [applicant's] cause may be just, its means are not.
Id. at 169.
100. Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289, 331, 341
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (defendant's motion to dismiss class claims for lack of personal jurisdiction and
on grounds of forum non conveniens denied); No. 01 CIV. 9882 (DLC), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
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Talisman Energy, Inc., of actively assisting the Sudan's Muslim
government in its "ethnic cleansing" 10 1 campaign against non-Muslim
African peoples (primarily practitioners of Christian and indigenous
religions) in southern Sudan. Talisman is alleged to have facilitated
the government's genocidal policy in exchange for valuable oil
concessions, which recently netted it $700 million. 1
0 2
In a comprehensive and evidently well-researched decision,
issued shortly before his death in March 2003, Judge Schwartz
recounted the tortured history of Sudan, its political divisions and
religious strife, and the hardships that have befallen those African
peoples residing in the southern region of the country. 10 3 His decision,
as a ruling on motions to dismiss, did not constitute a formal factual
finding, and indeed, the legal standard on such motions requires a
complaint's allegations to be presumed true rather than determined
on the merits.10 4 Yet it is clear from the context of the decision, which
features apparently the original scholarship and research by the court,
that in the judicial view, these claims merit ongoing discovery,
potential class certification, and adjudication in the United States
courts. 10
5
IV. THE HUMAN RIGHTS/MASS TORT JURISPRUDENCE FEEDBACK LOOP
Practitioners and courts in human rights litigation have had no
option but to innovate, test, and stretch the boundaries of procedural
and substantive law in just pursuit of their just causes. When the
compensation sought as a remedy is understood to symbolize a deeper
justice than the law's limited response to unlimited or unfathomable
17030, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2004) (defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction denied).
101. According to Honorable Allen G. Schwartz, who authored the comprehensive 2003
decision denying defendant Talisman's motion to.dismiss the southern Sudanese allegations, the
term "ethnic cleansing" emerged from the recent warfare in the former Yugoslavia, and is a
translation of the Serbo-Croatian term "etniko cis cenje." Presbyterian Church of Sudan, 244 F.
Supp. 2d at 296 n.2. It is, the court found, "commonly understood to be a euphemism for
genocide" but, unlike genocide, is not (yet) a legal term of art. Id.
102. Id. at 296.
103. Id. at 297-302.
104. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 268 (U.S. 1994) (In ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss, the court "accept[ed] the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint as true.").
105. Judge Schwartz's decision is amply footnoted and itself provides a rich source of
information for those interested in the unfolding tragedy in Sudan. While acknowledging that
this and other information "is presented solely to place the allegations set forth in the amended
complaint in context," the court expressly justifies its "judicial notice" of them, citing Chambers
v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147 (2d Cir. 2002) ("on a motion to dismiss, a court may consider
[...] matters of which judicial notice may be taken [. ). Presbyterian Church of Sudan, 244 F.
Supp. 2d at 297 n.6.
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HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
atrocity, explicit or implicit authorization to experiment and to expand
is the result. The beneficiaries are not only the plaintiffs and class
members in these human rights cases but also, at least indirectly, the
courts and litigants who face the challenges that arise when mass
injuries or damages are caused by negligence, mistake, lack of
judgment, or averous-rather than intentional--atrocity.
Thus, the Marcos litigation has served as a model for the
design of trial structures and proof methodologies in a variety of cases,
and the class certification and class notice orders in Swiss Banks have
been cited by other courts addressing the claims of foreign or
international classes. More mundane international mass tort
litigation will continue to contribute to the jurisprudential foundation
upon which future human rights cases can build. A recent example is
an otherwise typical "mass accident" case, arising out of a single-
incident disaster, in this case, on foreign soil: a tragic tunnel fire that
killed scores of passengers on an Austrian ski train in late 2000.106
Tort claims were brought as class actions on behalf of the victims in
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. Most,
but not all, of the 155 passengers and crew members killed were
Europeans, but some of the manufacturers whose components were
used in the train's construction were American, or had American
offices or assets. In a series of rulings, Judge Shira Scheindlin, the
transferee judge in the resulting MDL litigation has determined the
propriety of jurisdiction over the parties and certified an "opt-in"
plaintiff class of the victims. 10 7
V. CONCLUSION: MAKING A RECORD AND PROMOTING AN
INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW
Litigation that alleges violations of international law and
pursues tort claims for damages and equitable relief'0 8 on behalf of
groups victimized by genocide, ethnic cleansing, and other atrocities
fulfills a unique role in creating and sustaining an official record of
crimes against humanity. As with the case of the gypsy victims of the
106. Background information on the ski train tragedy and resulting American litigation is
contained in Kern v. Osterreichische Elektrizitaetswirtschaft AG, 178 F. Supp. 2d 367 (S.D.N.Y.
2001).
107. See In re Ski Train Fire in Kaprun Austria on November 11, 2000, 220 F.R.D. 195, 211
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (conditionally certifying an opt-in class); 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22139, at *31
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 9, 2003) (finding lack of personal jurisdiction over one of the defendants); 67 Fed.
App. 24 (2d Cir. 2003).
108. Such equitable relief may include restitution and disgorgement.
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Nazi regime, it is all too easy for history to omit, and the public to
forget, the details, or even the existence, of egregious genocidal
episodes. The record created by published opinions, transcripts, and
clerk's dockets assures, at the least, that there will be a permanent
record-immune from expungement, spoliation, or revision by
interested or implicated governments or perpetrators--of these
events. 109
Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc.110
stands as an exemplar of the "witness" function of federal civil
litigation to assure remembrance of human rights violations, as well
as a "paradigm"11 ' human rights tort that fulfills the newly articulated
Supreme Court ATCA criteria in Sosa. This case has already, while in
its incipient pleading stages, advanced-or at least protected from
depredation-substantive law principles that are essential to
plaintiffs' success in an array of international tort cases. 112  In
Presbyterian Church of Sudan, defendant Talisman Energy, Inc., a
Canadian corporation with American and overseas subsidiaries and
assets, argued with a straight face (but fortunately without success)
that "corporations are legally incapable of violating the laws of
nations."11 3 Talisman mustered academic support for this dangerous
theory. It presented affidavits "by two renowned international law
109. Speaking at the settlement Fairness Hearing in Swiss Banks, Plaintiffs' counsel
Professor Burt Neuborne concluded:
I make one final observation, because I think it's an observation that we shouldn't lose
sight of. The Nazi evil is one of the great human catastrophes of history, and its effect
on the Jewish people is one of the stories of dread that will be repeated for as long as
there is history. But it was a universal evil that harmed others than Jews. And class
counsel, in order to recognize that, insisted that Jehovah's Witnesses, the disabled,
gays and the Romany will share in the settlement as well.
Fairness Hearing Transcript at 36:25-37:9.
110. 244 F. Supp. 2d 289 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
111. Sosa v. Humberto Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2762 (2004).
112. One current example of the multinational impact of mass production and international
mass marketing is that of the incipient international tort litigation faced by Merck & Co., Inc.
over the September 30, 2004 withdrawal of its arthritis prescription drug Vioxx off the market.
2003 sales of Vioxx totaled over $2.7 billion in the United States, and the recall announcement
stripped $27 billion from the market value of Merck shares. See John Greenwood, Merck
Plummets As Drug Pulled, FINANCIAL POST (Canada), Oct. 1, 2004, at 1. News reports reflect
that Merck's Vioxx was sold not only in the United States and Canada, but across Europe and
South America as well. Litigation already has commenced, in the wake of the recall, in the
United States and Canada, and foreign victims claiming Vioxx-related injuries will undoubtedly
seek to pursue their claims in the United States' federal courts.
113. 244 F. Supp. 2d at 308. Talisman argued "that international law applies to states and




scholars," James Crawford and Christopher Greenwood. 114 The court
was unpersuaded.
115
This corporate immunity argument seems absurd, in light of
the fact that the Supreme Court's sole ATCA decision, before the
issuance of Sosa in 2004, was brought by a corporation against the
Argentine government. 16 Yet the fact that it was seriously put
forward augers for its repeated appearance.
It is to be expected that any defendant in a civil action, even
one in which the tort amounts to genocide, will muster any and all
conceivable arguments to obtain dismissal. Nonetheless, the serious
effort to establish a doctrine of international corporate immunity has
ominous implications. This doctrine might gain credence with courts
in a purely commercial mass tort context, where the wrongdoing may
constitute strict liability, negligence, or even fraud, but human rights
violations are not at issue. One favored-an increasingly successful-
strategy of corporate defendants in consumer class actions or mass
injury litigation, such as those arising from the recall of a dangerous
drug or other product, is to argue that the Seventh Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution demands individualized trials of each plaintiffs
claims, regardless of recurring common questions relating to the
defendant's product, knowledge, conduct, and duty - thereby
insisting on retail adjustments of a wholesale wrong. Insistence on
disaggregation of claims in a mass tort may deny due process to most
litigants, who cannot afford the cost - or the delay - of obtaining
their own trials. A few courts have seen through, and castigated
defendants for, such cynical sophistry.1 7 Yet it is perceived more
clearly as an attempt or occasion by which multinational corporations
may advance their ability to conduct business as they see fit, beyond
effective regulation or enforcement, when human rights on
international norms are threatened. Human rights class actions, such
as Presbyterian Church of Sudan, stand thus in the protective
114. Id.
115. Id. ("Both scholars, consulting a variety of international sources, concluded there is no
basis in existing international law for the liability of corporations. Nonetheless, a considerable
body of United States and international precedent indicates that corporations may be liable for
violations of international law, particularly when their actions constitute jus cogens violations.").
116. Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428 (1989). As Judge
Schwartz noted, "nothing in that case addresses the potential liability of a corporate defendant in
a claim under the ATCA, although the Court did note that the ATCA 'by its terms does not
distinguish among classes of defendants.' " Presbyterian Church of Sudan, 244 F. Supp. 2d at
309 (citations omitted).
117. See, e.g., Klay v. Humana, Inc., 382 F.3d 1241, 1300 (11th Cir. 2004) (rejecting the view
that multiple juries should be required to decide common issues repeatedly, the court stated,
inter alia, "we find such reasoning unpersuasive and contrary to the ends of justice").
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vanguard of international tort litigation. Presbyterian Church of
Sudan illustrates the role of human rights litigation in unmasking
and defeating the subliminal arguments advanced by multinational
corporations to avoid liability for tortious conduct, by enabling the
courts to evaluate the newly advanced theories of corporate immunity
in a context in which the harm resulting from such insulation stands
in stark relief.
The federal courts of the United States are likely to continue as
the fora of first choice by international victims of atrocities in pursuit
of monetary compensation, punishment, and deterrence for corporate
and governmental torts. These human rights mass torts will, in
return, contribute new ideas, exemplars of innovative trial structures,
and creative settlement provisions to enrich the entire field of mass
torts jurisprudence.
